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Abstract: We propose a new t^ atonnement process called a double-track auc-
tion for eciently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible items in two
distinct sets S1 and S2 to many buyers who view items in the same set as sub-
stitutes but items across the two sets as complements. The auctioneer initially
announces suciently low prices for items in one set, say S1, but suciently
high prices for items in the other set S2. In each round, the buyers respond
by reporting their demands at the current prices and the auctioneer adjusts
prices upwards for items in S1 but downwards for items in S2 based on buyers'
reported demands until the market is clear. Unlike any existing auction, this
auction is a blend of a multi-item ascending auction and a multi-item descend-
ing auction. We prove that the auction nds an ecient allocation and its
market-clearing prices in nitely many rounds. Based on the auction we also
establish a dynamic, ecient and strategy-proof mechanism.
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11 Introduction
T^ atonnement processes or auctions are fundamental instruments for discovering market-
clearing prices and ecient allocations. The study of such processes provides one way of
addressing the question of price formation and has long been a major issue of economic
research. In 1874 Leon Walras formulated a rst t^ atonnement process-a type of auction.
Samuelson (1941), Arrow and Hurwicz (1958), were among the rst to study the conver-
gence of certain t^ atonnement processes. They proved that such processes converge globally
to an equilibrium for any economy with divisible goods when the goods are substitutable.
This study then generated great hope that such processes might also work for a larger class
of economies with divisible goods. But Scarf (1960) soon dashed such hopes by showing
that when goods exhibit complementarity, such processes can oscillate and will never tend
towards equilibrium. Later it was Scarf (1973) who developed a remarkable process that
can nd an equilibrium in any reasonable economy with divisible goods.
The current paper explores adjustment processes for markets with indivisible goods.4
To motivate it, let us review the related literature. In a seminal paper, Kelso and Craw-
ford (1982) developed an auction-like process that allows each rm to hire several workers.5
They showed that their process eciently allocates workers with competitive salaries to
rms, provided that every rm views all the workers as substitutes. This condition is
called gross substitutes (GS) and has been widely used, adapted and extended in auction,
matching, and equilibrium models.6 Gul and Stacchetti (2000) devised an elegant ascending
auction that nds a Walrasian equilibrium in nitely many steps when all goods are substi-
tutes. While their analysis is mathematically sophisticated and quite demanding, Ausubel
(2006) signicantly simplied the analysis by developing a simpler and more elegant dy-
namic auction. Based on his auction, he also proposed a novel dynamic strategy-proof
procedure yielding a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome. As in Kelso and Crawford (1982),
Milgrom (2000) proposed a less information demanding auction for nding an approximate
equilibrium but converging to an equilibrium in the limit. However, all these processes were
designed and work only for substitutes. It is widely recognized7 that complementarities
4For a related but dierent problem, Scarf (1986) introduced a theory of testing optimality of production
plans in the presence of indivisibility.
5Special but well-studied models typically assume that every consumer demands at most one item or
every person needs only one opposite sex partner. See Gale and Shapley (1962), Shapley and Scarf (1974),
Crawford and Knoer (1981), Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) among others.
6See Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Laan, Talman and Yang (1997),
Ma (1998), Bevia, Quinzii and Silva (1999), Gul and Stacchetti (1999), Fujishige and Yang (2003), Milgrom
(2004), Crawford (2005), Hateld and Milgrom (2005), and Ostrovsky (2007) among others.
7The current state of the art is well documented in Milgrom (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003),
Klemperer (2004) and Maskin (2005). We quote from Milgrom (2000, p. 258): \The problem of bidding
for complements has inspired continuing research both to clarify the scope of the problem and to devise
2pose a challenge for designing dynamic mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices
and ecient allocations.
This paper aims to show that certain typical patterns of complementarity together with
substitutability can be handled by a new dynamic auction design. More specically, we
study a market model where a seller wishes to sell two distinct sets S1 and S2 of several
heterogeneous items to a number of buyers. The buyers view items in the same set as
substitutes but items across the two sets as complements. This condition is called gross
substitutes and complements (GSC), generalizing the GS condition. Many typical situations
t this general description, stretching from the sale of computers and software packages to
consumers, to the allocation of workers and machines to rms, take-o and landing slots to
airliners, etc.8 In our earlier analysis (Sun and Yang (2006B)), we showed that if all agents
in an exchange economy have GSC preferences, the economy has a Walrasian equilibrium.
But the method is non-constructive, and so in particular, the important issue of how to
nd the equilibrium prices and allocation is not dealt with. The existing auctions, however,
are hindered by the exposure problem and cannot handle this situation. In contrast, in this
paper we propose a new t^ atonnement process {a double-track auction that can discover a
Walrasian equilibrium. The auction proceeds as follows. The auctioneer initially calls out
suciently low prices for items in one set, say S1, but suciently high prices for items in the
other set S2 so that all items in S1 are over-demanded but those in S2 are under-demanded.
In each round, buyers are asked to report their demands at the current prices. Based on
buyers' reported demands, the auctioneer adjusts prices upwards for those over-demanded
items in S1 but downwards for those under-demanded items in S2 until the market is clear.
In nitely many rounds the auction pinpoints an ecient allocation and its market-clearing
prices. Unlike traditional t^ atonnement processes that typically adjust prices continuously,
the auction process adjusts prices only in integer or xed quantities.
The proposed auction circumvents the exposure problem confronting the existing auc-
tions and diers markedly from them in that it adjusts simultaneously prices of items in S1
and S2 respectively in opposite directions,9 whereas the existing auctions typically adjust
all prices simultaneously only in one direction (either ascending or descending). When
practical auction designs that overcome the exposure problem." The so-called exposure problem refers to
a phenomenon concerning an ascending auction that at the earlier stages of the auction, all items were
over-demanded, but as the prices are going up, some or all items may be exposed to the possibility that
no bidder wants to demand them anymore, because complementary items have become too expensive. As
a result, the ascending auction will get stuck in disequilibrium.
8Ostrovsky (2007) independently proposed a similar condition for a supply chain model where prices
of goods are xed and a non-Walrasian equilibrium (weak core) solution is used. See also Shapley (1962),
Samuelson (1974), Rassenti, Smith and Buln (1982), Krishna (2002) and Milgrom (2007).
9This double-track idea can be used elsewhere such as to extend Kelso-Crawford's job-matching model
by permitting complementarities among employees; see Sun and Yang (2006A).
3all items are substitutes (i.e., either S1 = ; or S2 = ;), the proposed auction coincides
with Ausubel's (2006) auction and is similar to Gul and Stacchetti (2000). In general the
proposed auction deals with the circumstances including complements that go beyond the
existing models with substitutes. Another attractive feature of the proposed auction is
that it only requires the buyers to report their demands at several price vectors along a
nite path rather than their entire values over all possible bundles so that their privacy
can be protected. This is important, because businessmen generally do not like to reveal
their values or costs. Based upon the proposed auction, we also establish a dynamic, ef-
cient and strategy-proof mechanism for the environments with complements. So there
is no benet to any buyer from acting strategically rather than bidding truthfully in this
mechanism. To design the new auction, it is crucial to introduce a new characterization
of the GSC condition called generalized single improvement (GSI), generalizing the single
improvement (SI) property of Gul and Stacchetti (1999). GSI plays the same important
role in our auction design as SI does in Ausubel (2006), Gul and Stacchetti (2000).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the market model. Section 3
presents the double-track auction and discusses its basis, its properties and its convergence.
Section 4 introduces a dynamic, ecient and incentive compatible procedure based on the
double-track auction. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Market Model
An auctioneer (or seller) wishes to sell a set N = f1;2;;ng of n indivisible items
to a nite group I of buyers (or bidders). The items may be heterogeneous and can be
divided into two sets S1 and S2 (i.e., N = S1 [ S2 and S1 \ S2 = ;). For instance, one can
think of S1 as computers and of S2 as software packages. Items in the same set can also be
heterogeneous. Every buyer i has a utility function ui : 2N ! I R specifying his valuation
ui(B) (in units of money) on each bundle B with ui(;) = 0, where 2N denotes the family
of all bundles of items. It is standard to assume that ui is weakly increasing, every buyer
can pay up to his value and has quasi-linear utilities in money, and the seller values every
bundle at zero. Note, however, that weak monotonicity can be dropped; see Sun and Yang
(2006A-B).
A price vector p = (p1;;pn) 2 I R
n species a price ph for each item h 2 N. Buyer
i's demand correspondence Di(p), the net utility function vi(A;p), and the indirect utility
function V i(p), are dened respectively by
Di(p) = argmaxANfui(A)  
P
h2A phg;
vi(A;p) = ui(A)  
P
h2A ph; and




4It is known that for any utility function ui : 2N ! I R, the indirect utility function V i is a
decreasing, continuous and convex function.
An allocation of items in N is a partition  = ((i);i 2 I) of items among all buy-
ers in I, i.e., (i) \ (j) = ; for all i 6= j and [i2I(i) = N. Note that (i) = ; is




i2I ui((i)) for every allocation . Given an ecient allocation , let
R(N) =
P
i2I ui((i)). We call R(N) the market value of the items which is the same for
all ecient allocations.
Denition 2.1 A Walrasian equilibrium (p;) consists of a price vector p 2 I R
n
+ and an
allocation  such that (i) 2 Di(p) for every i 2 I.
It is well-known that every equilibrium allocation is ecient, but an equilibrium may not
always exist. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we need to impose some condi-
tions on the model. The most important one is called gross substitutes and complements
condition, which is dened below.10
Denition 2.2 The utility function ui of buyer i satises the gross substitutes and com-
plements (GSC) condition if for any price vector p 2 I R
n, any item k 2 Sj for j = 1 or 2,
any   0, and any A 2 Di(p), there exists B 2 Di(p+e(k)) such that [A\Sj]nfkg  B
and [Ac \ Sc
j]  Bc.
GSC says that buyer i views items in each set Sj as substitutes, but items across the two
sets S1 and S2 as complements, in the sense that if the buyer wants to demand a bundle
A at prices p and if now the price of some item k 2 Sj is increased, then he would still
want to demand the items both in A and in Sj whose prices did not rise, but he would not
want to demand any item in another set Sc
j which was not in his choice set A at prices p.
In particular, when either S1 = ; or S2 = ;, GSC reduces to the gross substitutes (GS)
condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982). GS excludes complements and requires that all
the items be substitutes. This case has been studied extensively in the literature; see e.g.,
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), Milgrom (2000), and Ausubel
(2006). Now we state the assumptions for the current model:
(A1) Integer private values: Every buyer i's utility function ui : 2N ! Z+ takes integer
values and is his private information.
10The following piece of notation is used throughout the paper. For any positive integer k  n, e(k)
denotes the kth unit vector in I R
n. Let Z
n stand for the integer lattice in I R
n and 0 the n-vector of 0's.
For any subset A of N, let e(A) =
P
k2A e(k). When A = fkg, we also write e(A) as e(k). For any
subset A of N, let Ac denote its complement, i.e., Ac = N nA. For any vector p 2 I R
n and any set A 2 2N,
let p(A) =
P
k2A pke(k). So we have p(N) = p for any p 2 I R
n. For any nite set A, ](A) denotes the
number of elements in A. For any set D  I R
n, co(D) denotes its convex hull.
5(A2) Gross substitutes and complements: Every buyer i's utility function ui satises the
GSC condition with respect to the two sets S1 and S2.
(A3) The auctioneer's knowledge: The auctioneer knows some integer value U greater
than any buyer's possible maximum value.
The essence and diculty of designing a mechanism for locating a Walrasian equilibrium
in this market lie in the facts that every buyer's valuation of any bundle of goods is
private information and is therefore unobservable to the auctioneer (A1); and that there
are multiple indivisible substitutes and complements for sale (A2). We point out that (A3)
is merely a technical assumption used only in Theorem 3.9.
3 The Double-Track Adjustment Process
3.1 The Basis
This subsection provides the basis on which the double-track procedure will be established
for nding a Walrasian equilibrium in the market described in the previous section. We
begin with a new characterization of the GSC condition.
Denition 3.1 The utility function ui of buyer i has the generalized single improvement
(GSI) property if for any price vector p 2 I R
n and any bundle A 62 Di(p), there exists a
bundle B 2 2N such that vi(A;p) < vi(B;p) and B satises exactly one of the following
conditions:
(i): A \ Sj = B \ Sj, and ][(A n B) \ Sc
j]  1 and ][(B n A) \ Sc
j]  1 for either j = 1, or
j = 2;
(ii): either B  A and ][(A n B) \ S1] = ][(A n B) \ S2] = 1, or A  B and ][(B n A) \ S1]
= ][(B n A) \ S2] = 1.
GSI says that for buyer i, every suboptimal bundle A at prices p can be strictly improved
by either adding an item to it, or removing an item from it, or doing both in either set
A \ Sj. The bundle A can be also strictly improved by adding simultaneously one item
from each set Sj to it, or removing simultaneously one item from each set A\Sj, j = 1;2.
We call bundle B a GSI improvement of A. When either S1 or S2 is empty, GSI coincides
with the single improvement (SI) property of Gul and Stacchetti (1999) which in turn is
equivalent to the GS condition. The GSI property plays a crucial role both in proving
several of our main results and in our auction design. We now state the following theorem
whose proof together with those of Theorems 3.3, 3.5 and 3.10 and Lemmas 3.4, 3.6 and 3.8
is deferred to the Appendix.
6Theorem 3.2 Conditions GSC and GSI are equivalent.
Let p;q 2 I R
n be any vectors. With respect to the order (S1;S2), we dene their
generalized meet s = (s1;;sn) = p ^g q and join t = (t1;;tn) = p _g q by
sk = minfpk;qkg; k 2 S1; sk = maxfpk;qkg; k 2 S2;
tk = maxfpk;qkg; k 2 S1; tk = minfpk;qkg; k 2 S2:
Note that the two operations are dierent from the standard meet and join operations. A
subset W of I R
n is called a generalized lattice if p ^g q; p _g q 2 W for any p;q 2 W. A
generalized lattice is a rotated standard lattice. Given a generalized lattice W, we say a
function f : W ! I R is a generalized submodular function if f(p^gq)+f(p_gq)  f(p)+f(q)
for all p;q 2 W. A useful characterization of the generalized submodular function is given
in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. Ausubel and Milgrom (2002, Theorem 10) showed that
items are substitutes for a buyer if and only if his indirect utility function is submodular.
Our next theorem generalizes their result from GS to GSC preferences and will be used to
establish Theorem 3.5 below.
Theorem 3.3 A utility function ui satises the GSC condition if and only if the indirect
utility function V i is a generalized submodular function.
For the market model, dene the Lyapunov function L : I R









where V i is the indirect utility function of buyer i 2 I. This type of function is well-known
in the literature for economies with divisible goods (see e.g., Arrow and Hahn (1971) and
Varian (1981)) but was only recently explored ingeniously by Ausubel (2005, 2006) in the
context of indivisible goods. His Proposition 1 in both papers shows that if an equilibrium
exists, then the set of equilibrium price vectors coincides with the set of minimizers of
the Lyapunov function. The following Lemma 3.4 strengthens this result by providing a
necessary and sucient condition for the existence of an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4 For the market model, p 2 I R
n is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and
only if it is a minimizer of the Lyapunov function L dened by (3.2) with its value L(p)
equal to the market value R(N).
Given a subset W of I R
n, we dene a new order on W  W with respect to the order
(S1;S2) as follows: for any p;q 2 W, p g q if and only if p(S1)  q(S1) and p(S2)  q(S2).
A point p 2 W is called a smallest element if p g q for every q 2 W. Similarly, a
point q 2 W is called a largest element if q g p for every p 2 W. It is easy to verify
that a compact generalized lattice has a unique smallest (largest) element in it. A set
7D  I R
n is integrally convex if D = co(D) and x 2 D implies x 2 co(D \ N(x)), where
N(x) = fz 2 Z
n j jjz   xjj1 < 1g and jj  jj1 means the maximum norm, i.e., every point
x 2 D can be represented as a convex combination of integral points in N(x) \ D. Favati
and Tardella (1990) originally introduced this concept for discrete subsets of Z
n. The
following theorem will be used to prove the convergence of the double-track procedure.
Theorem 3.5 Assume that the market model satises Assumptions (A1) and (A2). Then
(i) the Lyapunov function L dened by (3.2) is a continuous, convex and generalized sub-
modular function;
(ii) the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in the model forms a nonempty, com-
pact, integrally convex and generalized lattice, implying that all its vertices including both its
smallest and largest equilibrium price vectors, denoted by p and  p respectively, are integer
vectors.
The theorem asserts that (i) the Lyapunov function is a well-behaved function meaning
that a local mimimum is also a global mimimum; and (ii) the set of Walrasian equilibrium
price vectors possesses an elegant geometry: (1) the set is an integral polyhedron, i.e., all
vertices including p and  p are integer vectors; and (2) the intersection of the set with any
unit hypercube fxg + [0;1]n for x 2 Z
n is integrally convex and thereby all of its vertices
are integer vectors.
3.2 An Illustration
The existing auctions typically adjust all prices simultaneously in one direction, are either
ascending or descending, and generally do not work in the environments with complements.
It is helpful to use a simple example to illustrate how an ascending (or descending) auction
might be plagued by the exposure problem and how the new auction proposed in this
paper overcomes the problem and succeeds in nding a Walrasian equilibrium. Consider
now a market where a seller wishes to sell two volumes A and B of a book to two buyers.
Each buyer knows his values privately and the seller knows only that all values are below 6.
Buyers' values are given in the Table 1, and the seller values every bundle at zero. Observe
that every buyer views A and B as complements.
Table 1: Buyers' values over items.
; A B AB
Buyer 1 0 2 2 5
Buyer 2 0 2 2 5
The ascending auction: In an ascending auction, the seller initially announces a low
price vector of p(0) = (pA(0);pB(0)) = (0;0) so that every buyer demands both A and B.
8Buyers respond by reporting their demand sets at p(0): D1(p(0)) = D2(p(0)) = fABg.
According to the reported demand sets, the seller subsequently adjusts the price vector
p(0) to the next one p(1) = p(0) + (0) = (1;1) by increasing the price of every good by
1, because both goods are over-demanded at p(0). The seller faces a similar situation at
p(1) and p(2). The auction ends up with the price vector p(3) = (3;3) at which no bidder
wants to demand the items anymore, and thus gets stuck in disequilibrium. We summarize
the entire process in the Table 2. The reader can also verify that starting with a high
price vector p(0) = (pA(0);pB(0)) = (q;q) for any integer q  6 so that no buyer demands
any item, a descending auction will terminate with the price vector  p = (2;2) at which
both buyers demand both items, and thus get stuck in disequilibrium, too. We remind the
reader that prices in auction processes are adjusted in integer or xed quantities.
Table 2: The data created by the ascending auction for the example.
Price vector Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Price variation
p(0) = (0;0) fABg fABg (0) = (1;1)
p(1) = (1;1) fABg fABg (1) = (1;1)
p(2) = (2;2) fABg fABg (2) = (1;1)
p(3) = (3;3) f;g f;g (3) = (0;0)
The double-track auction: Unlike the previous two cases, in the current double-track
auction, the seller initially announces a price vector of p(0) = (pA(0);pB(0)) = (0;6) (a
low price for item A but a high price for item B) so that every buyer demands only item
A and not item B. Buyers respond by reporting their demand sets at p(0): D1(p(0)) =
D2(p(0)) = fAg. Using the reported demands, the seller subsequently adjusts the price
vector p(0) to the next one p(1) = p(0)+(0) = (1;5) by increasing the price of A by 1 but
decreasing the price of B by 1, because A is over-demanded but B is under-demanded at
p(0). At p(1), the seller faces a similar situation. An interesting moment occurs when p(1)
advances to p(2) = (2;4) at which B is clearly still under-demanded, but A can be seen
as either over-demanded or balanced. According to the rule of the double-track auction
(to be discussed soon in detail), the seller treats A as balanced and so she adjusts p(2) to
p(3) = (2;3) by decreasing the price of B by 1 and holding the price of A constant. At p(3),
the market reaches an equilibrium in which the seller can assign items A and B to buyer
1 and asks him to pay 5, while buyer 2 gets nothing and pays nothing. We can summarize
the entire process in the Table 3. Observe that in this process, the seller increases the
price of item A (since it is over-demanded) but decreases the price of item B (since it is
under-demanded) until the market is clear. So to a large extent, this double-track auction
is also similar to the classical Walrasian t^ atonnement process.
9Table 3: The data created by the double-track auction for the example.
Price vector Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Price variation
p(0) = (0;6) fAg fAg (0) = (1; 1)
p(1) = (1;5) fAg fAg (1) = (1; 1)
p(2) = (2;4) f;;Ag f;;Ag (2) = (0; 1)
p(3) = (2;3) f;;A;ABg f;;A;ABg (3) = (0;0)
3.3 The Formal Procedure
We are now ready to give a formal description of the double-track adjustment process.11
This process can be seen as an extension of Ausubel (2006) from GS to GSC preferences
environments and thus from the standard order  to the new order g.12 More specically,
when either S1 = ; or S2 = ; (i.e., all items are substitutes to the buyers), this new process
coincides exactly with Ausubel's. The new order g diers from the standard order  used
by the existing auctions in that the new process adjusts prices of items in one set upwards
but at the same time adjusts prices of items in the other set downwards. Therefore, we
dene an n-dimensional cube for price adjustment by
2 = f 2 I R
n j 0  k  1;8k 2 S1;  1  l  0;8l 2 S2 g:
For any buyer i 2 I, any price vector p 2 Z
n and any price variation  2 2, choose
~ S






The next lemma asserts that for any buyer i, any p 2 Z
n and any  2 2, his optimal
bundle ~ Si in (3.3) chosen from Di(p) remains constant for all price vectors on the line
segment from p to p + . This property is crucial for the auctioneer to adjust the current
price vector to the next one and is a consequence of the GSI property.
Lemma 3.6 If Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold for the market model, then for any i 2 I,
any p 2 Z
n and any  2 2, the solution ~ Si of Formula (3.3) satises ~ Si 2 Di(p + )
and the Lyapunov function L(p + ) is linear in , for any parameter   0 such that
0  k  1 for every k 2 S1 and  1  l  0 for every l 2 S2.
Given a current price vector p(t) 2 Z
n, the auctioneer rst asks every buyer i to report
his demand Di(p(t)). Then she uses every buyer's reported demand Di(p(t)) to determine
the next price vector p(t + 1). The underlying rationale for the auctioneer is to choose a
11We refer to Yang (1999) for various adjustment processes for nding Walrasian equilibria, Nash equi-
libria and their renements in the continuous models.
12This process can be also viewed as a direct generalization of Gul and Stacchetti (2000) from GS to
GSC environments. We adopt here the Lyapunov function approach instead of matroid theory used by
Gul and Stacchetti, because the former is more familiar in economics and much simpler than the latter.
10direction  2 2 so as to reduce the value of the Lyapunov function L as large as possible.
To achieve this, she needs to solve the following problem
max
22
fL(p(t))   L(p(t) + )g (3.4)
Note that the above formula involves every buyer's valuation of every bundle of goods,
so it uses private information. Apparently, it is impossible for the auctioneer to know
such information unless the buyers tell her. Fortunately, she can fully infer the dierence
between L(p(t)) and L(p(t) + ) just from the reported demands Di(p(t)) and the price
variation . To see this, we know from the denition of the Lyapunov function that for
any given p(t) 2 Z
n and  2 2, the dierence is given by









Although, at prices p(t), each buyer i may have many optimal choices, his indirect
utility V i(p(t)) at p(t) is unique since every optimal choice gives him the same indirect
utility. Lemma 3.6 tells us that some ~ Si of his optimal choices remains unchanged when
prices vary from p(t) to p(t)+. It is immediately clear that his indirect utility V i(p(t)+)
at prices p(t)+ equals V i(p(t)) 
P
h2~ Si h. Now we obtain the change in indirect utility
for buyer i when prices move from p(t) to p(t) + . This change is unique and is given by
V
i(p(t))   V








where ~ Si is a solution given by (3.3) for buyer i with respect to price vector p(t) and the
variation . Consequently, the equation (3.5) becomes the following simple formula whose
right side involves only price variation  and optimal choices at p(t):






















The next result shows that the set of solutions to Problem (3.4) is a generalized lat-
tice and both its smallest and largest elements are integral, resembling Theorem 3.5 and
following also from the generalized submodularity of the Lyapunov function.
Lemma 3.7 If Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold for the market model, then the set of
solutions to Problem (3.4) is a nonempty, integrally convex and generalized lattice and both
its smallest and largest elements are integer vectors.
Given the current price vector p(t), the next price vector p(t+1) is given by p(t+1) =
p(t) + (t), where (t) is the unique smallest element as described in the above lemma.
Since (t) is an integer vector, this implies that the auctioneer does not need to search
everywhere in the cube 2 for achieving a maximal decrease in the value of the Lyapunov
11function. It suces to search only the vertices (i.e., the integer vectors) of the cube 2
and doing so will lead to the same maximal value decrease of the Lyapunov function. Let
 = 2 \ Z
n. By (3.7), the decision Problem (3:4) of the seller boils down to computing


















The max-min in the above formula has a meaningful and interesting interpretation: when
the prices are adjusted from p(t) to p(t + 1) = p(t) + (t), all buyers try to minimize their
losses in indirect utility whereas the seller strives for the highest gain. Nevertheless, the
entire computation for (3.8) is carried out solely by the seller according to buyers' reported
demands Di(p(t)). The computation of (3.8) is fairly simple because the seller can easily
calculate the value (minS2Di(p(t))
P
h2S h) for each given  2  and buyer i. Now we
summarize the adjustment process as follows.
The dynamic double-track (DDT) auction
Step 1: The auctioneer announces an initial price vector p(0) 2 Z
n
+ with p(0) g p.
Let t := 0 and go to Step 2.
Step 2: After the announcement of p(t), the auctioneer asks every buyer i to report
his demand Di(p(t)). Then according to (3.8) and reported demands Di(p(t)), the
auctioneer computes the unique smallest element (t) (in the order g) and obtains
the next price vector p(t+1) := p(t)+(t). If p(t+1) = p(t), then the auction stops.
Otherwise, let t := t + 1 and return to Step 2.
First, observe that this auction simultaneously adjusts prices upwards for items in S1
and downwards for items in S2. So on the side of S1, the auction runs like an English
auction, while on the other side of S2, it does like a Dutch auction. But the auction
does not run two sides independently. Second, the auction rules adhere to the Wilson
doctrine (Wilson (1987)) in the sense that they are simple, transparent and detail-free to
the bidders. Third, to ensure p(0) g p, the auctioneer just needs to set the initial prices of
items in S1 so low and those of items in S2 so high that all items in S1 are over-demanded
but all items in S2 are under-demanded. This can be easily done because every buyer's
utility function ui is weakly increasing with ui(;) = 0 and is bounded above from U given
in Assumption (A3). For instance, the auctioneer can simply take p(0) = (p1(0);;pn(0))
by setting pk(0) = 0 for any k 2 S1 and pk(0) = U for any k 2 S2. Note that the choice
of initial prices of the items can have an eect on the speed of the auction's convergence.
Observe from the proof of the following Lemma 3.8 in the Appendix that Lemma 3.8
(i) and (ii) are independent of the choice of p(0).
12Lemma 3.8 Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the DDT auction has the following prop-
erties:
(i) p(t) g p implies p(t + 1) g p.
(ii) p(t + 1) = p(t) implies p(t) g p.
We are ready to establish the following convergence theorem for the DDT auction.
Theorem 3.9 For the market model under Assumptions (A1){(A3), the DDT auction
converges to the smallest equilibrium price vector p, in a nite number of rounds.
Proof: Recall that by Theorem 3.5 (ii), the market model has not only a nonempty set
of equilibrium price vectors but also a unique smallest equilibrium price vector p. Let
fp(t);t = 0;1;g be the sequence of price vectors generated by the auction. Note that
p(t+1) = p(t)+(t), (t) 2 2\Z
n for t = 0;1;, and that p(t) g p(t+1) for t = 0;1;,
and all p(t) are integer vectors. Step 1 of the auction implies that p(0) g p and Lemma 3.8
(i) implies that p(t) g p for all t. Since (t) is an integer vector for any t and the sequence
fp(t);t = 0;1;g is bounded above from p, the sequence must be nite. This means that
p(t) = p(t + 1) for some t, i.e., the sequence can be written as fp(t);t = 0;1;;tg.
Note that p(t) 6= p(t + 1) and (t) 6= 0 for any t = 0;1;;t   1. By Lemma 3.8 (ii),
p(t) g p. Because of p(t) g p, it is clear p(t) = p. This shows that the auction indeed
terminates with the smallest equilibrium price vector p, in a nite number of rounds. 2
The DDT auction has the drawback that it converges to an equilibrium price vector
only if p(0) g p. To overcome this shortcoming, we propose the following modied DDT
auction which can start from any integer price vector and still converges to an equilibrium
price vector. Analogous to the discrete set , dene the discrete set  =  . Through
, we lower prices of items in S1 but raise prices of items in S2.
The global dynamic double-track (GDDT) auction
Step 1: Choose any initial price vector p(0) 2 Z
n
+. Let t := 0 and go to Step 2.
Step 2: The auctioneer asks every buyer i to report his demand Di(p(t)) at p(t). Then
based on reported demands Di(p(t)), the auctioneer computes the unique smallest
element (t) (in the order g) according to (3.8). If (t) = 0, go to Step 3. Otherwise,
set the next price vector p(t + 1) := p(t) + (t) and t := t + 1. Return to Step 2.
Step 3: The auctioneer asks every buyer i to report his demand Di(p(t)) at p(t). Then
based on reported demands Di(p(t)), the auctioneer computes the unique largest


















13If (t) = 0, then the auction stops. Otherwise, set the next price vector p(t + 1) :=
p(t) + (t) and t := t + 1. Return to Step 3.
First, observe that Step 2 of the GDDT auction is the same as Step 2 of the DDT auction
and Step 3 of the GDDT auction is also the same as Step 2 of the DDT auction except that
in Step 3 we switch the role of S1 and S2 by moving from  to . Second, the GDDT
auction terminates in Step 3 and never goes from Step 3 to Step 2. Third, because the
order g is dened in the specied order of (S1;S2), the auctioneer computes the unique
largest element (t) in Step 3 (which is equivalent to the unique smallest element if we
redene the order g in the order of (S2;S1)). Note that Theorem 3.10 dispenses with
Assumption (A3).
Theorem 3.10 For the market model under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), starting with
any integer price vector, the GDDT auction converges to an equilibrium price vector in a
nite number of rounds.
4 The Dynamic Strategy-Proof Procedure
We now address the strategic issue such as When confronting an auction, is honesty the
best policy for every bidder? More specically, does sincere bidding constitute a Nash
equilibrium (or its variants) of the auction game? If it is the case, the auction is said to be
strategy-proof. The (sealed-bid) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is strategy-proof.
The dynamic auction of Ausubel (2006) not only possesses this important strategy-proof
property but also oers advantages of informational eciency, transparency and privacy
preservation. The auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) also has the same
properties but applies to a less general model in which every buyer can demand only one
item. The outcome yielded by a dynamic strategy-proof auction often coincides with the
VCG outcome. According to Gul and Staachetti (1999, 2000), the VCG outcome typically
lies outside the set of Walrasian equilibria in the sense that the VCG payment is generally
below the Walrasian equilibrium payment. Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) further observed
that in the presence of complementarity, the VCG outcome may lie outside the core.
Built upon the proposed GDDT auction, we will develop a dynamic strategy-proof
auction for the current more general environment with both complements and substitutes,
thus extending Ausubel's auction for substitutes. We use the following notation. Let M
denote the market with the set I of bidders and the set N of items, and for each bidder
i 2 I, let M i denote the market M without bidder i. Let I i = I n fig for every i 2 I
and for convenience also let M 0 = M, I 0 = I, M = I [ f0g, and M i = M n fig for
i 2 M. Furthermore, let U denote the family of all utility functions u : 2N ! Z+ satisfying
Assumptions (A1) and (A2).
14We now introduce the following PGDDT auction mechanism in which every bidder
acts strategically and may not behave as a price-taker. The mechanism runs the GDDT
auction for all markets M m (m 2 M) simultaneously in parallel and in coordination. The
GDDT auction works for every market M m exactly as described in Section 3 but needs
the following modications: Consider any market M m. At t 2 Z+ and p m(t) 2 Z
n
+,
every bidder i 2 I m reports a choice set Ci
 m(t)  2N (which need not be his demand set



















If the auctioneer nds a unique smallest (largest) solution  m(t) of (4.10) for  () in
the order g, she obtains the next price vector p m(t + 1) = p m(t) +  m(t) whenever
 m(t) 6= 0. We say the GDDT auction nds an allocation  m in M m if  m(t) = 0
for  (i.e., in Step 3 of the auction) and  m(i) 2 Ci
 m(t) for all i 2 I m. The GDDT
auction needs to go back to Step 2 from Step 3 if  m(t) = 0 for  but it nds no
allocation  m in M m such that  m(i) 2 Ci
 m(t) for all i 2 I m|this modication is
meant to tolerate minor mistakes or manipulations committed by bidders. The GDDT
auction detects serious manipulation if it nds no unique smallest (largest) solution  m(t)
of (4.10) for  (), or if p
 m
h (t+1) < 0 for some h 2 N, or if it never nds an allocation
in M m in which case the auction is said to stop at time 1. Now we have
The parallel global dynamic double-track (PGDDT) auction13
Step 1: Run the GDDT auction simultaneously in parallel for every market M m
(m 2 M) by starting with a common initial price vector p m(0) = p(0) 2 Z
n
+. At
t 2 Z+ and p m(t) 2 Z
n, every bidder i 2 I m reports a choice Ci
 m(t)  2N and the
auctioneer nds the next price vector p m(t + 1) = p m(t) +  m(t). If the GDDT
auction detects serious manipulations in any market, go to Step 3. Otherwise, the
GDDT auction continues until it nds an allocation  m in every market M m
(m 2 M) at p m(T  m) 2 Z
n
+, and T  m 2 Z+. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: In this case all markets are clear. For every bidder i 2 I, every m 2 M i and
every t = 0;1;;T  m 1, let 
 m
i (t) denote the \indirect utility change" of bidder
i in I m when prices move from p m(t) to p m(t + 1), where

 m








13We can also use the DDT auction to construct a similar parallel auction.
15Every bidder i 2 I is assigned the bundle  0(i) of the allocation  0 found in the






















Step 3: In this case every bidder receives no item but is assigned a payo of  1.
The auction stops.
The payment qi of bidder i has an intuitive interpretation: qi is equal to the accumu-
lation of \indirect utility changes" of his opponents l 2 I i along the path from p i(T  i)





h {the equilibrium payments by bidder i's opponents in the




h (T  i){the equilibrium payments by bidder i's opponents
in the market M i.
It is simple but important to observe that the PGDDT auction tolerates minor mistakes
or manipulations committed by bidders and allows them to correct so that for any time
t 2 Z+, no matter what has happended before t, as long as from t on every bidder i bids
according to his GSC utility function ui, the auction will nd a Walrasian equilibrium in
every market in nitely many rounds and thus terminates in Step 2, because the GDDT
auction converges to a Walrasian equilibrium from any integer price vector.
To study the incentive properties of the PGDDT auction mechanism, we will formulate
this auction as an extensive-form dynamic game of incomplete information in which bidders
are players. Prior to the start of the (auction) game, nature reveals to every player i 2
I only his own utility function ui 2 U of private information and a joint probability
distribution F() from which the prole fuigi2I is drawn. Let Ht
i be the part of the
information (or history) of play that player i has observed just before he submits his choice
sets at time t 2 Z+. A natural and sensible specication is that Ht
i comprises the complete







 m(s) j m 2 M;j 2 I;0  s < t;m 6= jg
Note that Ht
i = Ht
j for all i;j 2 I, namely, all bidders share a common history just like in
an English auction. Let T  be the time when the PGDDT auction stops at Steps 2 or 3. If
the auction has found an allocation in any M m, for consistency and convenience, we dene
Ci
 m(t) = Ci
 m(T  m) and p m(t) = p m(T  m) for any i 2 I m and any t 2 Z+ between
T  m and T . After any history Ht
i and at any time t 2 Z+, each player i updates his
posterior beliefs i( j t;Ht
i;ui) over opponents' utility functions; see also Ausubel (2006).
We stress that even after the auction is nished, player i may not know his opponents'
utility functions precisely.
16A (dynamic) strategy i of player i(i 2 I) is a set-valued function f(t;m;Ht
i;ui) j t 2
Z+;m 2 M i;ui 2 Ug ! 2N, which tells him to bid i(t;m;Ht
i;ui)  2N for every market
M m(m 2 M i) at each time t 2 Z+ when he observes Ht
i. Let i denote player i0s
strategy space of all such strategies i. We say that i is a sincerely bidding strategy for
player i if he always reports his demand set Di(p m(t)) as dened by (2.1)with respect to

















Clearly, the strategy space i of player i contains sincere bidding strategies and also various
other strategies.
Given the auction rules, the outcome of this auction game depends entirely upon the
realization of utility functions and the strategies the bidders take. When every bidder i 2 I
takes a strategy i and the PGDDT auction terminates in Step 2, then bidder i 2 I receives
bundle  0(i) and pays qi given by (4:12). When every bidder i 2 I takes a strategy i
and the PGDDT auction stops in Step 3, every bidder gets nothing but a payo of  1.








ui( 0(i))   qi if the auction stops in Step 2,
 1 if the auction stops in Step 3.
For auction games of incomplete information, the ex post equilibrium was used by
Cr emer and McLean (1985) for a sealed-bid auction (see also Krishna (2002)) and the
ex post perfect equilibrium by Ausubel (2006) for a dynamic auction. Stronger than
Bayesian equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium, these notions of equilibrium have a
number of additional desirable properties, i.e., they are not only robust against any regret
but also independent of any probability distribution. Following Ausubel (2006), the ](I)-
tuple figi2I is an ex post perfect equilibrium if for any time t 2 Z+, any history prole
fHt
igi2I, and any realization fuigi2I of prole of utility functions of private information, the
continuation strategy i( j t;Ht
i;ui) of every player i 2 I (i.e., i(s;m;Hs
i j t;Ht
i;ui)  2N
for all s  t, m 2 M i and Hs
i ) constitutes his best response against the continuation
strategies fj( j t;Ht
j;uj)gj2I i of player i's opponents of the game even if the realization
fuigi2I becomes common knowledge.
Before presenting our next result, we brie
y review the VCG auction for the marekt M.
In this auction every bidder i 2 I reports his utility function ui to the auctioneer. Then
she computes an ecient allocation  with respect to all bidders' reported ui and assigns
bundle (i) to bidder i and charges him a payment of q
i = ui((i))   R(N) + R i(N),
where R(N) and R i(N) are the market values of the markets M and M i based on ui
(i 2 I), respectively. Bidder i's VCG payo equals R(N)   R i(N).
17Theorem 4.1 Suppose that the market M satises Assumptions (A1) and (A2).
(i) When every bidder bids sincerely, the PGDDT auction converges to a Walrasian equi-
librium and yields a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome for the market M in a nite number
of rounds.
(ii) Sincere bidding is an ex post perfect equilibrium in the PGDDT auction.
Proof: We rst prove (i). By the argument in Section 3, we see that when every bidder i
bids sincerely according to his true GSC utility function ui , the auction terminates at Step
2 and nds a Walrasian equilibrium (p m(T  m); m) in every market M m, m 2 M. By
















for all i 2 I and m 2 M (i 6= m), where Ci
 m(t) = Di(p m(t)) and V i is bidder i's indirect
utility function based on ui. Using these equations, we will show that qi coincides with the
VCG payment q










t=0 (V j(p 0(t))   V j(p 0(t + 1)))
 
PT i 1









































= ui( 0(i))   R(N) + R i(N)
= q
i :
Bidder i0s payo ui( 0(i))   qi equals his VCG payo R(N)   R i(N).
Now we prove (ii). Consider any time t 2 Z+, any history prole fHt
j gj2I (which
may be on or o the equilibrium path), and any realization fujgj2I of prole of utility
functions in UI of private information.14 Take any player i 2 I. Suppose that in the
continuation game from time t on, every opponent j(j 2 I i) of player i bids sincerely at
















14In this case, the outcome of the game depends on the histories Ht

j and the strategies that all bidders
will take in the continuation game starting from t. Bidders cannot change histories but can in
uence the
path of the future from t on.
18Clearly, in this continuation game from time t, when all opponents of player i choose
sincere bidding strategies, because of the payo of  1, bidder i strictly prefers a strategy
which results in the auction terminating at Step 2, to any other strategies which result in the
auction stopping at Step 3. Therefore, it sucient to compare the sincere bidding strategy




i in short) is such a continuation strategy of player i resulting in an
allocation  for M, and that bidder i's (continuation) sincere bidding strategy results in
an allocation  for M. Without any loss of generality, we assume that by the time t, the
auction for the markets M and M i has not yet nished, i.e., t < T  0 and t < T  i.
When player i chooses the strategy 0
i, his payment q0
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Observe that constant is totally determined by the history prole fHt
j gj2I and the market
M i without bidder i, and does not depend on player i's strategy 0





j (t) for t < t cannot be expressed by V j, because player j may not have bid according
to uj before t). Analogously we can show that when bidder i uses the (continuation)
sincere bidding strategy, his payment ~ qi will be ~ qi = constant  
P
j2I i uj((j)); where
constant is the same as the previous one. Furthermore, we know from the argument in
Section 3 that (in the continuation game) when bidders bid sincerely according to their













Consequently, for bidder i0s payo ~ Wi with the sincere bidding strategy and his payo W 0
i
with the strategy 0
i, we have





j2I i uj((j))   constant
 ui((i)) +
P




19This shows that sincere bidding is an ex post perfect equilibrium. 2
The current dynamic procedure yields the same outcome as that of the VCG auction,
but oers several advantages over the VCG auction: First, it utilizes information from
every buyer eciently and judiciously in that it only requires him to report his demand
sets on a number of price vectors, whereas the VCG auction is sealed-bid and requires every
buyer to report his entire values. In reality, businessmen generally do not like to reveal their
values even if truth-telling may be theoretically a dominant strategy; see e.g., Rothkopf
(2007). Second, the current procedure gives a simple and transparent way of computing
ecient allocations, equilibrium prices and VCG payments using observable information,
whereas the VCG auction tells only a way of computing VCG payments assuming that all
buyers' values and ecient allocations are already given.
While both the current dynamic procedure and Ausubel's (2006) compute a Walrasian
equilibrium in every market M m (m 2 M) somehow like the VCG auction that needs
to compute every market M m value R m(N), the current procedure and analysis dier
from Ausubel's in several aspects: First, the current procedure applies to the environment
with both complements and substitutes, while Ausubel's applies to the environment with
substitutes. Second, his procedure and payment rule are not symmetric, whereas the
current procedure and payment rule are symmetric and simpler. Third, Ausubel's analysis
on the VCG outcome focuses on economies with divisible goods and relies on calculus and
Theorem 1 of Krishna and Maenner (2001) but he mentioned that his analysis can be
analogously done for his model with indivisible goods under the GS condition, whereas the
current analysis is quite dierent from his and in fact very elementary and simple.
5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a short summary highlighting the main contributions of the current
paper and pointing out some open question. We proposed the (G)DDT auction that nds
Walrasian equilibria and tells us about Walrasian equilibria in the circumstances containing
complements that move beyond those we could handle before. The essential feature of the
proposed dynamic auction is that it adjusts the prices of items in one set upwards but those
of items in the other set downwards. Based upon the GDDT auction, we also introduced
a dynamic, ecient and strategy-proof mechanism for the same environments. The GSI
property plays a crucial role in establishing these procedures.
The current model is of private value. For models with interdependent values, we refer
to Milgrom and Weber (1982), Crem er and McLean (1985), and more recently to Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Krishna (2002), Perry and Reny (2002,
2005), and Ausubel (2004). It is of considerable interest but also signicantly more dicult
20to extend the current model to the interdependent value framework.
Appendix
The following lemma gives a dierent formulation of the GSC condition, saying that
instead of adjusting the price of a single item, one can actually simultaneously increase the
prices of several items in one set Sj and decrease the prices of several items in another set
Sc
j. The original denition of GSC has the advantage of simplicity and is easy to use in
checking whether a utility function has the GSC property or not, whereas this alternative
shows the rich properties of GSC and is very useful in mechanism design and proving
theorems.
Lemma 1 A utility function ui : 2N ! I R satises the GSC condition if and only if for
any price vectors p;q 2 I R
n with qk  pk for all k 2 Sj for j = 1 or 2 and ql  pl for all
l 2 Sc
j, and for any bundle A 2 Di(p), there exists a bundle B 2 Di(q) such that
fk j k 2 A \ Sj and qk = pkg  B and fl j l 2 A
c \ S
c
j and ql = plg  B
c:
Proof: \Suciency" is obvious. Let us prove \Necessity". First, recall that Lemma 1 of
Sun and Yang (2006B) says a utility function ui : 2N ! I R satises the GSC condition if
and only if for any p 2 I R
n, any k 2 Sj for j = 1 or 2, any   0, and any A 2 Di(p),
there exists B 2 Di(p   e(k)) such that [Ac \ Sj] n fkg  Bc and [A \ Sc
j]  B.
For any p 2 I R
n and any A 2 Di(p), we consider the following three basic cases and the
other cases can be proved in an analogously recursive way.
Case (i), ~ p = p + ke(k) + k0e(k0), where the two dierent objects k and k0 are both in
Sj and k > 0;k0 > 0. By the denition of the GSC condition, there exists B0 2 Di(p +
ke(k)) such that [A\Sj]nfkg  B0 and [Ac\Sc
j]  B0c. Since ~ p = (p+ke(k))+k0e(k0), for
B0 2 Di(p+ke(k)), there is B 2 Di(~ p) such that [B0\Sj]nfk0g  B and [B0c\Sc
j]  Bc.
Thus we have [A \ Sj] n fk;k0g  B and [Ac \ Sc
j]  Bc, namely,
fx j x 2 A \ Sj and ~ px = pxg  B and fy j y 2 A
c \ S
c
j and ~ py = pyg  B
c:
Case (ii), ~ p = p   le(l)   l0e(l0), where the two dierent objects l and l0 are both in Sc
j
and l > 0;l0 > 0. It follows from the above equivalent formulation of the GSC condition
that there exists B0 2 Di(p   le(l)) such that [Ac \ Sc
j] n flg  B0c and [A \ Sj]  B0.
Since ~ p = (p   le(l))   l0e(l0), for B0 2 Di(p   le(l)) there is B 2 Di(~ p) such that
[B0c \ Sc
j] n fl0g  Bc and [B0 \ Sj]  B. Thus we obtain that [Ac \ Sc
j] n fl;l0g  Bc
and [A \ Sj]  B, namely,
fx j x 2 A \ Sj and ~ px = pxg  B and fy j y 2 A
c \ S
c
j and ~ py = pyg  B
c:
21Case (iii), ~ p = p + ke(k)   le(l), where k 2 Sj, l 2 Sc
j, and k > 0;l > 0. By the
denition of the GSC condition, there exists B0 2 Di(p+ke(k)) such that [A\Sj]nfkg 
B0 and [Ac\Sc
j]  B0c. Note that ~ p = (p+ke(k)) le(l). Then, it follows from the above
equivalent formulation of the GSC condition that for B0 2 Di(p+ke(k)) there is B 2 Di(~ p)
such that [B0c \ Sc
j] n flg  Bc and [B0 \ Sj]  B. So we have [Ac \ Sc
j] n flg  Bc and
[A \ Sj] n fkg  B, namely,
fx j x 2 A \ Sj and ~ px = pxg  B and fy j y 2 A
c \ S
c
j and ~ py = pyg  B
c:
2
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need to introduce an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2 A utility function ui : 2N ! I R satises the GSI condition, if and only if, for
any price vector p 2 I R
n and any set A 62 Di(p), there exists another set B(6= A) satisfying
one of the conditions (i) and (ii) of Denition 3.1 and vi(A;p)  vi(B;p).
Proof \Necessity" is obvious. Let us prove \Suciency". Suppose that for any price
vector p 2 I R
n and any set A 62 Di(p), there exists a set B(6= A) satisfying one of the
conditions (i) and (ii) of Denition 3.1 and vi(A;p)  vi(B;p). Continuity of the indirect
utility function V i() and the net utility function vi(A;) both in the price vector implies
that there is a suciently small  > 0 such that V i(q) > vi(A;q) for q = p+e(Ac) e(A).
That is, A 62 Di(q). Thus, for the price vector q, there exists a set B(6= A) satisfying one
of the conditions (i) and (ii) of Denition 3.1 and vi(A;q)  vi(B;q). This leads to
vi(B;p)   vi(A;p) = vi(B;q)   vi(A;q) + [](A n B) + ](B n A)] > vi(B;q)   vi(A;q)  0.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.2 We rst prove that GSC implies GSI. By Lemma 2, it is
sucient to show that for any price vector p 2 I R
n and any set A 62 Di(p), there exists
another set B(6= A) satisfying one of the conditions (i) and (ii) of Denition 3.1 and
vi(A;p)  vi(B;p).
First, observe that since the utility obtained by consuming any bundle of items is nite,
regardless of the prices of other items the buyer i will never demand item k when its price
is too high but will always demand it when its price is very low (may be quite negative).
Formally, for the given price vector p there exists a large real number M such that for
any price vector q 2 I R
n, any T 2 Di(q) and any k 2 N, qk  pk + M implies k 62 T,
and qk  pk   M implies k 2 T.
Now choose any set C 2 Di(p). Since A 62 Di(p), we clearly have vi(C;p) = V i(p) >
vi(A;p) and thus C 6= A. There are two possibilities. Case (1) C n A 6= ;, and Case (2)
CnA = ; and AnC 6= ;. Dene ^ p = p+Me(Ac \ Cc). Then, we still have C 2 Di(^ p) and
vi(C; ^ p) = V i(^ p) = V i(p) > vi(A;p) = vi(A; ^ p), and consequently A 62 Di(^ p). It might be
helpful to draw gures when considering the following cases with respect to various sets.
22In Case (1), i.e., C n A 6= ;, choose an item k 2 C n A and assume k 2 Sj for some
j = 1 or 2. Let  p = ^ p + Me([C n (A [ fkg)] \ Sj)   Me(A \ Sc
j). Note that when
^ p changes to  p, the price of item k does not change. Then, with regard to C 2 Di(^ p)
and k 2 C \ Sj, it follows from the GSC condition and Lemma 1 that there exists a set
 C 2 Di( p) such that k 2  C. Clearly, fkg  (  C n A) \ Sj. Meanwhile, observe that
 p = p + Me(Ac n [(C \ Sc
j) [ fkg])   Me(A \ Sc
j). Then, by the denition of M and
the construction of  p, we have (  C nA)\Sj  fkg and A\Sc
j   C. In summary, it yields
(  C n A) \ Sj = fkg and A \ Sc
j   C.
In Subcase (1-1) in which (  C n A) \ Sc
j 6= ;, select an item h 2 (  C n A) \ Sc
j. Let
~ p =  p + Me([C n (A [ fhg)] \ Sc
j)   Me(A \ Sj). Note that when  p changes to ~ p, the
price of item h does not change. Then, with regard to  C 2 Di( p) and h 2  C \ Sc
j, it
follows from the GSC condition and Lemma 1 that there exists a bundle B 2 Di(~ p) such
that h 2 B. Observe that ~ p = p + Me(Ac n fk;hg)   Me(A). Then the denition of
M and the construction of ~ p imply that A  B, and B n A  fk;hg. Thus we have
A n B = ;, and B n A = fh;kg or fhg. Namely, the set B satises the condition (i) or
(ii) of Denition 3.1.
In Subcase (1-2) in which (  C n A) \ Sc
j = ; and (A n  C) \ Sj 6= ;, choose an item
h 2 (An  C)\Sj. Let ~ p =  p+Me((C nA)\Sc
j) Me((A\Sj)nfhg)). Note that when
 p changes to ~ p, the price of item h does not change. Then, with regard to  C 2 Di( p)
and h 2 Sj n  C, it follows from the GSC condition and Lemma 1 that there exists a set
B 2 Di(~ p) such that h = 2 B. Next, observe that ~ p = p+Me(Ac nfkg) Me(Anfhg).
Then the denition of M and the construction of ~ p imply that AnB  fhg and B nA 
fkg. Therefore we have AnB = fhg, and B nA = fkg or ;. This shows that the set B
satises the condition (i) or (ii) of Denition 3.1.
In Subcase (1-3) in which  C = A [ fkg, let ~ p =  p and B =  C. Then, B satises the
condition (i) of Denition 3.1.
In Case (2), i.e., C  A and AnC 6= ;, choose an item k 2 AnC and assume k 2 Sj
for some j = 1 or 2. Let  p = ^ p   Me((A n fkg) \ Sj). Note that when ^ p changes to  p,
the price of item k does not change. Then, with regard to C 2 Di(^ p) and k 2 Sj n C,
it follows from the GSC condition and Lemma 1 that there exists a set  C 2 Di( p) such
that k = 2  C. Meanwhile, note that  p = p + Me(Ac)   Me((A \ Sj) n fkg). Then, by
the denition of M and the construction of  p, we have  C  A and (A n  C) \ Sj  fkg.
Consequently, it leads to  C  A and (A n  C) \ Sj = fkg.
In Subcase (2-1) in which (A n  C) \ Sc
j 6= ;, choose an item h 2 (A n  C) \ Sc
j. Let
~ p =  p Me((Anfhg)\Sc
j). Note that when  p changes to ~ p, the price of item h does not
change. Then, with regard to  C 2 Di( p) and h 2 Sc
jn  C, it follows from the GSC condition
and Lemma 1 that there exists a bundle B 2 Di(~ p) such that h 62 B. Next, note that
23~ p = p+Me(Ac) Me(Anfk;hg). Then the denition of M and the construction of ~ p
imply that B  A and AnB  fh;kg. Therefore, we have B  A, and AnB = fh;kg
or fhg. Thus the set B satises the condition (i) or (ii) of Denition 3.1.
In Subcase (2-2) in which  C = A n fkg, let ~ p =  p and B =  C. Then, B satises the
condition (i) of Denition 3.1.
By summing up all above cases, we conclude that there always exist a price vector ~ p
and a set B 2 D(~ p) satisfying one of the condition (i) and (ii) of Denition 3.1. By the
construction of B, we see B 6= A in each case. Then, it follows from B 2 Di(~ p) that
vi(B; ~ p) = V i(~ p)  vi(A; ~ p). Furthermore, by the construction of ~ p, we see ~ p([AnB][[B n
A]) = p([AnB][[BnA]). As a result, we have vi(B;p) vi(A;p) = vi(B; ~ p) vi(A; ~ p)  0.
In this way we proved that GSC implies GSI.
It remains to show that GSI implies GSC. Choose any price vector p 2 I R
n, k 2 Sj for
some j = 1 or 2,   0, and A 2 Di(p). It is clear that if k = 2 A, then A 2 Di(p + e(k)).
If we choose B = A, then the GSC condition is immediately satised. Now we assume that
k 2 A. Let  = V i(p)   V i(p + e(k)). Then we have 0    , A 2 Di(p + e(k)) and
V i(p+e(k)) = V i(p)  for all  2 [0;]. We need to consider two separate cases. First,
if  = , then we have A 2 Di(p + e(k)) and we can choose B = A. Clearly, the GSC
condition is satised. In the rest, we deal with the case of  < . In this case we have
V i(p+e(k)) = V i(p+e(k)) and A 62 Di(p+e(k)) for all  > . In particular, we have
A 62 Di(p+e(k)). Now let fg be any sequence of positive real numbers which converges
to 0. Since A 62 Di(p+( +)e(k)), it follows from the GSI condition that there exists a
GSI improvement set B of A such that vi(B;p+(+)e(k)) > vi(A;p+(+)e(k)).
Notice that k does not belong to any such GSI improvement set B. Suppose that this
statement is false. Then for some  we would have vi(B;p+e(k))  = vi(B;p+(+
)e(k)) > vi(A;p+(+)e(k)) = vi(A;p+e(k)) . This leads to vi(B;p+e(k)) >
vi(A;p + e(k)) = V i(p + e(k)), yielding a contradiction. Meanwhile, since the number
of sets B is nite, without loss of generality we can assume that there exists a positive
integer  such that B = B for all   . Then by the continuity of net utility function
vi(B;), we have vi(B;p + e(k)) = vi(A;p + e(k)) = V i(p + e(k)) = V i(p + e(k)).
In addition, since k 62 B, we have vi(B;p + e(k)) = vi(B;p + e(k)) = V i(p + e(k)).
This implies B 2 Di(p + e(k)). Furthermore, since B is a GSI improvement set of A and
k 62 B, it satises either
(i): A \ Sc
j = B \ Sc
j, and (A n B) \ Sj = fkg and ][(B n A) \ Sj]  1; or
(ii): B  A, and (A n B) \ Sj = fkg and ][(A n B) \ Sc
j] = 1.
This concludes that [A \ Sj] n fkg  B and Ac \ Sc
j  Bc and thus the GSC condition is
satised. 2
The next lemma extends a well-known property of a submodular function to its new
24generalization, saying that (i) the marginal utility of an additional item decreases if the
bundle of items to which it is added gets smaller in its complement set (gets larger in its
same set for (ii)). Property (i) is new but (ii) is familiar.
Lemma 3 A function f is a generalized submodular function if and only if
(i): for any x 2 I R
n, any k 2 Sj, any l 2 Sc
j, any k > 0 and l > 0,
f(x + ke(k)   le(l))   f(x   le(l))  f(x + ke(k))   f(x); and
(ii): for any x 2 I R
n, any distinct k;l 2 Sj, any k > 0 and l > 0,
f(x + ke(k) + le(l))   f(x + le(l))  f(x + ke(k))   f(x):
Proof: Suppose that f is a generalized submodular function. In the case of (i), let p =
x + ke(k) and q = x   le(l). Then p ^g q = x and p _g q = x + ke(k)   le(l). Clearly
(i)'s conclusion holds. It is also easy to check the case of (ii).
Suppose that both (i) and (ii) hold. Take any p;q 2 I R
n. With respect to S1 and S2,
let
JS1 = fj j pj > qj and j 2 S1g
KS1 = fk j pk < qk and k 2 S1g
JS2 = fj j pj > qj and j 2 S2g
KS2 = fk j pk < qk and k 2 S2g:
We consider the most general case, namely, all the above four sets are nonempty. So
there exists a nonnegative vector  = (1;;n)  0, such that pj = qj + j for all
j 2 JS1[JS2 and pj = qj j for all j 2 KS1[KS2: Let JS1 = fh1;;hsg, KS1 = fi1;;itg,
25JS2 = fj1;;jug, and KS2 = fk1;;kvg. Then we have
f(p)   f(p ^g q)
































































































































































































































































= f(p _g q)   f(q)
Therefore we have f(p ^g q) + f(p _g q)  f(p) + f(q). In the above derivation, the rst
two inequalities follow from case (ii) and the last two follow from case (i). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Necessity: Choose any two distinct items k;l 2 N, any
p 2 I R
n, any k > 0, and any l > 0. If V i(p)   V i(p + ke(k)) = 0, the monotonicity of
V i() implies that V i(p + le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p + le(l))  0 = V i(p + ke(k))   V i(p)
and V i(p   le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p   le(l))  0 = V i(p + ke(k))   V i(p). We can
now assume that V i(p)   V i(p + ke(k)) = k > 0. Then it follows that 0 < k  k,
26V i(p + ke(k)) = V i(p + ke(k)) = V i(p)   k, and there are a bundle A 2 Di(p) and a
bundle B 2 Di(p + ke(k)) (for example, B = A) with k 2 A \ B. We need to consider
the following two situations.
Case 1: l and k are in the same set Sj. With regard to A 2 Di(p) and B 2
Di(p + ke(k)), it follows from the GSC condition and k 2 A \ B that there are two
bundles C 2 Di(p + le(l)) with k 2 C and D 2 Di(p + le(l) + ke(k)) with k 2 D. As
a result, we have
V i(p + le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p + le(l))
 V i(p + le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p + le(l))
= vi(D;p + le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p + le(l))
= vi(D;p + le(l))   k   V i(p + le(l))
  k = V i(p + ke(k))   V i(p):
Case 2: l and k are not in the same set Sj. With regard to A 2 Di(p) and B 2
Di(p+ke(k)), it follows from the GSC condition, Lemma 1 and k 2 A\B that there are
two bundles C 2 Di(p   le(l)) with k 2 C and D 2 Di(p   le(l) + ke(k)) with k 2 D,
which leads to
V i(p   le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p   le(l))
 V i(p   le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p   le(l))
= vi(D;p   le(l) + ke(k))   V i(p   le(l))
= vi(D;p   le(l))   k   V i(p   le(l))
  k = V i(p + ke(k))   V i(p):
In summary, we see through Lemma 3 that V i is a generalized submodular function.
Suciency: Suppose to the contrary that there are some p 2 I R
n, k 2 Sj, k > 0, and
A 2 Di(p) such that for every B 2 Di(p+ke(k)) we have [A\Sj]nfkg 6 B or Ac\Sc
j 6 Bc.
Let k = V i(p) V i(p+ke(k)). Clearly, 0  k  k, V i(p+ke(k)) = V i(p+ke(k)), and
A 2 Di(p+ke(k)). Since A = 2 Di(p+ke(k)), it holds that Di(p+ke(k)) 6= Di(p+ke(k))
and k < k. Let q = p+ke(k) and k = k k > 0. Then V i(q) = V i(q+ke(k)). Observe
that A 2 Di(q) and B = 2 Di(q + ke(k)) for every bundle B satisfying [A \ Sj] n fkg  B
and Ac \ Sc
j  Bc. This means that V i(q + ke(k)) > vi(B;q + ke(k)) for every bundle B
satisfying [A\Sj]nfkg  B and Ac \Sc
j  Bc. Furthermore, the continuity of V i() and
vi(B;) implies that there exists a suciently small positive number  so that
V i






B;q + ke(k)   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

for every bundle B satisfying [A \ Sj] n fkg  B and Ac \ Sc
j  Bc. This means that
if B 2 Di

q + ke(k)   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

, then [A \ Sj] n fkg 6 B or
27Ac\Sc








q + ke(k)   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

= vi(B;q + ke(k)   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j))
= vi(B;q + ke(k) +  p)
= vi(B;q + ke(k))  
P
k2B  pk
= vi(B;q + ke(k)) + ](B \ ([A \ Sj] n fkg))   ](B \ (Ac \ Sc
j))
< vi(B;q + ke(k)) + ]([A \ Sj] n fkg)
 V i(q + ke(k)) + ]([A \ Sj] n fkg);
where  p =  e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j). Therefore we have
V i

q   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

= V i(q) + ]([A \ Sj] n fkg)
= V i(q + ke(k)) + ]([A \ Sj] n fkg)
> V i





Let x = q and y = q+ke(k) e([A\Sj]nfkg)+e(Ac\Sc
j). Then the above inequality
leads to
V i(x ^g y) + V i(x _g y) = V i

q   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

+ V i(q + ke(k))
> V i(q) + V i

q + ke(k)   e([A \ Sj] n fkg) + e(Ac \ Sc
j)

= V i(x) + V i(y);
contradicting the hypothesis that V i is a generalized submodular function. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.4 Suppose that p is an equilibrium price vector. Then we know
from Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Lemma 6) that for any ecient allocation , (p;)
constitutes an equilibrium. Clearly,
P
i2I ui((i)) = R(N) the market value of the objects.
Furthermore, we have L(p) =
P











h = R(N). Note that for any p 2 I R
n and i 2 I, V i(p)  ui((i))  
P
h2(i) ph.














(i)) = R(N) = L(p
):
Hence, L(p) = minp2I Rn L(p), i.e., p is a minimizer of the function L with L(p) = R(N).
Suppose that ^ p is a minimizer of L with its value L(^ p) = R(N). Let  be any ecient
allocation of the model. We will show that (^ p;) is an equilibrium. Clearly, we have V i(^ p) 
ui((i))  
P
h2(i) ^ ph for every i 2 I. We need to show that V i(^ p) = ui((i))  
P
h2(i) ^ ph
for every i 2 I. Suppose to the contrary that V j(^ p) > uj((j))  
P
h2(j) ^ ph for some
bidder j. Adding the previous inequalities over all bidders leads to L(^ p) > R(N). This
contradicts the hypothesis that ^ p is a minimizer of L with L(^ p) = R(N). Thus (^ p;) must
be an equilibrium. 2
28Proof of Theorem 3.5 By Theorem 3.1 of Sun and Yang (2006B) the model has an
equilibrium. Then by Lemma 3.4 the set of equilibria is equal to the set of minimizers of
the Lyapunov function L. Let
 = argminfL(p) j p 2 I R
ng:
It follows from Theorem 3.3 and the remark after Formula (2.1) that the Lyapunov
function L is a continuous, convex and generalized submodular function. Now we prove
statement (ii). We rst show that  is a generalized lattice. Take any p;q 2 . So we have
L(p) = L(q) = R(N), where R(N) is the market value. Clearly, R(N)  L(p^gq)  L(p)+
L(q) L(p_g q)  2R(N) R(N) = R(N). This shows that L(p^g q) = L(p_g q) = R(N)
and p^g q;p_g q 2 . So the set  is a nonempty, convex and generalized lattice. Clearly,
 is also compact.
Next, we prove that  is also an integrally convex set. Suppose the statement is false.
Dene
A = fp 2  j p 62 co( \ N(p))g;
where N(p) = fz 2 Z
n j kz   pk1 < 1g. Then A is a nonempty subset of . Observe
that p 2 co( \ N(p)) for every p 2  \ Z
n because N(p) = fpg for every p 2 Z
n. And
so, A \ Z
n = ;. Let p 2 A be a vector that has at least as many integral coordinates as
any other vector in A has. Thus, the number of integral coordinates of p is the largest
among all vectors in A. Since co(N(p)) is a hypercube, it is a generalized lattice. Let
q be the generalized smallest element of co(N(p)). Obviously, q 2 Z




h is an integer. Let  = p   q. Clearly, 
h = 0 whenever p
h is an
integer. Then,  2 2 (dened before Lemma 3.6),  62 Z
n, and 0 < kk1 < 1. Dene
  = 1=kk1 > 1. By Lemma 3.615 we know that L(q +) is linear in  on the interval
[0;  ]. Recall that p is a minimizer of the Lyapunov function L. Thus, if q 62 , i.e.,
L(q) > L(p) = L(q + ), then L(p) > L(q +  ), yielding a contradiction. We now
consider the case where q 2 , i.e., L(q) = L(p) = L(q +). Then, it follows from the
linearity of L in  that L(p) = L(q +  ). That is, q +   2 . By the construction
of  , q +   has more integral coordinates than p. Therefore, by the choice of p, we
see that q +   2  n A. That is, q +   2 co( \ N(q +  )). Moreover, observe
that N(q +  )  N(p), q 2 co( \ N(p)), and p is a convex combination of q and
q+ . As a result, we have p 2 co(\N(p)), contradicting the hypothesis that p 2 A.
Finally, by denition, we know that every vertex of an integrally convex set is an integral
vector and thus every vertex of  must be integral as well. So all the vertices of , including
the generalized smallest and largest equilibrium price vectors p and  p, are integral vectors.
15Note tha Lemma 3.6 and its proof are independent of the current theorem and its proof.
29Furthermore, since the set  is bounded,  has a nite number of vertices. Clearly,  is
an integral polyhedron. 2
We extend and modify the arguments of Propositions 2 and 5 of Ausubel (2006) under
the GS condition to prove the following two lemmas under the GSC condition.
Proof of Lemma 3.6 Assume by way of contradiction that there exists  > 0 such
that 0  k  1 for any k 2 S1 and  1  l  0 for any l 2 S2 but ~ Si 62 Di(p + ).
By the GSI property, for ~ Si there exists a GSI improvement bundle A with vi(A;p+) >
vi(~ Si;p + ). By the construction of ~ Si, we see that vi(~ Si;p + )  vi(C;p + ) for all






On the other hand, since 0  k  1 for any k 2 S1 and  1  l  0 for any l 2 S2,
and A is a GSI improvement bundle of ~ Si, we must have j
P
h2~ Si h  
P








The two inequalities imply that vi(A;p + )  vi(~ Si;p + ), yielding a contradiction.
We now prove that the Lyapunov function L(p + ) is linear in  for any  > 0 such
that 0  k  1 for any k 2 S1 and  1  l  0 for any l 2 S2. By the rst part of the
lemma, for any such  and any bidder i 2 I we know ~ Si 2 Di(p + ), which immediately
yields









This shows that L(p + ) is indeed linear in  on the interval. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.8 (i) Suppose to the contrary that in the DDT auction process
there exists a price vector p(t) such that p(t) g p but p(t + 1) 6g p: Then, we have
p(t) ^g p = p(t) but
p(t) g (p(t + 1) ^g p) g p(t + 1) and (p(t + 1) ^g p) 6= p(t + 1) ()
On the other hand, recall from Lemma 3.4 that, since p is the smallest equilibrium price
vector in the order of g, it minimizes L() and so L(p)  L(p(t + 1) _g p). Since L() is
a generalized submodular function by Theorem 3.5 (i), we have L(p(t+1)_g p)+L(p(t+
1)^g p)  L(p(t+1))+L(p). Adding the previous inequalities leads to L(p(t+1)^g p) 
L(p(t+1)). By the construction of p(t+1), this implies that L(p(t+1)^g p) = L(p(t+1))
and so p(t + 1) g (p(t + 1) ^g p), contradicting inequality ().
30(ii) Suppose to the contrary that there exists a price vector p(t) such that p(t+1) = p(t)
but p(t) 6g p. Then p(t) ^g p is less than p in at least one component in the order of g.
Since p is the smallest equilibrium price vector in the order of g, we know that p(t) ^g p
is not an equilibrium price vector of the market model. Applying Lemma 3.4, this implies
that L(p) < L(p(t) ^g p). Since L() is a generalized submodular function, we also have
that L(p(t)_g p)+L(p(t)^g p)  L(p(t))+L(p). Adding the previous inequalities implies
that L(p(t)_gp) < L(p(t)). Since (p(t)_gp) g p(t) and (p(t)_gp) 6= p(t), there exists p0, a
strict convex combination of p(t) and p(t)_g p, such that p0 2 p(t)+2 and L(p0) < L(p(t))
due to the convexity of L() by Theorem 3.5 (i) and the previous strict inequality. By
Lemma 3.7, we know that L(p(t)+(t)) < L(p(t)), and hence p(t+1) 6= p(t), contradicting
the hypothesis. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.10 By Theorem 3.5 (ii) the market has a Walrasian equilibrium
and by Lemma 3.4 the Lyapunov function L() attains its mimimum value at any equilib-
rium price vector and is bounded from below. Since the prices and utility functions take
only integer values, the Lyapunov function is an integer valued function and it lowers by
a positive integer value in each round of the GDDT auction. This guarantees that the
auction terminates in nitely many rounds, i.e., (t) = 0 in Step 3 for some t 2 Z+.
Let p(0);p(1);;p(t) be the generated nite sequence of price vectors. Let  t 2 Z+ be
the time when the GDDT auction nds ( t) = 0 at Step 2. We claim that L(p)  L(p( t))
for all p g p( t). Suppose to the contrary that there exists some p g p( t) such that
L(p) < L(p( t)). By the convexity of L() via Theorem 3.5 (i), there is a strict convex
combination p0 of p and p( t) such that p0 2 p( t) + 2 and L(p0) < L(p( t)). By Lemma 3.7
we know that L(p( t) + ( t)) < L(p( t)), and so ( t) 6= 0 in Step 2 of the GDDT auction,
yielding a contradiction. Therefore, we have L(p_g p( t))  L(p( t)) for all p 2 I R
n, because
p _g p( t) g p( t) for all p 2 I R
n. We will further show that L(p _g p(t))  L(p(t)) for
all t =  t + 1; t + 2;;t and p 2 I R
n. By induction, it sucies to prove the case of
t =  t + 1. Notice that p( t + 1) = p( t) + ( t), where ( t) 2  is determined in Step
3 of the GDDT auction. Assume by way of contradiction that there is some p 2 I R
n
such that L(p _g p( t + 1)) < L(p( t + 1)). Then if we start the GDDT auction from
p( t + 1), we can by the same previous argument nd a (6= 0) 2  in Step 2 such that
L(p( t + 1) + ) < L(p( t + 1)). Since L() is a generalized submodular function, we have
L(p( t)_g (p( t+1)+))+L(p( t)^g (p( t+1)+))  L(p( t)+L(p( t+1)+). Recall that
L(p( t)_g(p( t+1)+))  L(p( t)). It follows that L(p( t)^g(p( t+1)+))  L(p( t+1)+) <
L(p( t + 1)). Observe that 0 = 0 ^g (( t) + ) 2  and p( t) ^g (p( t + 1) + ) = p( t) + 0.
This yields L(p( t) + 0) < L(p( t) + ( t)) and so 0 6= ( t), contradicting the denition of
( t) 2  by which L(p( t) + ( t)) = min2 L(p( t) + ).
By the symmetry between Step 2 and Step 3, as above we can also show that L(p ^g
31p(t))  L(p(t)) for all p 2 I R
n. We proved above that L(p _g p(t))  L(p(t)) for
all p 2 I R
n. Since L() is a generalized submodular function, we have L(p) + L(p(t)) 
L(p _g p(t)) + L(p ^g p(t))  2L(p(t)) for all p 2 I R
n. This shows that L(p(t))  L(p)
holds for all p 2 I R
n and by Lemma 3.4, p(t) is an equilibrium price vector. 2
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